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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to consider a representation of the HOL theorem-prover in the cal-
culus of constructions with the property that consistency results from the calculus of constructions
imply such results in HOL. This kind of representation is impossible using the propositions-as-types
representation of logic and equality, but it is possible if a different representation is used.
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Since the basic formalism of higher-order logic (HOL) is weaker than that of the cal-
culus of constructions, it seems natural to interpret the HOL theorem prover [1] in the
latter. However, there are some problems in carrying out such an interpretation. The HOL
theorem prover is based on classical logic, includes an -choice operator, and includes a
principle of extensionality in the form
(∀X : A)(∀Y : A)(∀x : A → Prop)((Xx ↔ Yx) ⊃ X =A Y ).
The calculus of constructions is based on constructive logic, and although it can be con-
sistently extended to classical logic by postulating excluded middle, it has been known for
some time that excluded middle together with an -choice operator leads to proof irrele-
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vance, which says that all terms in a small type are Leibniz equal; see [2], which follows [3]
and [4]. This would seem to make an interpretation of HOL in the calculus of constructions
impossible.
However, these problems all involve representing logic in type theories using the
proposition-as-types representation (also known as the formulas-as-types notion or the
Curry–Howard isomorphism), in which the types are interpreted as logical formulas and
the terms as proofs and, a type represents a provable formula if and only if it is inhabited.
There is an alternative representation, which we might call the Frege representation, in
which there is a type Bool in which there are distinct terms T and F, a term of type Bool
represents a formula, and a formula in this sense A is provable if and only if A=Bool T.
In this paper, I will use the Frege representation to interpret HOL in the calculus of
constructions. To make the paper relatively self-contained, I will review the definition of
the calculus of constructions in Section 1 and the propositions-as-types representation of
logic with equality in Section 2. In Section 3, I will take up the Frege-style representation
of logic with equality, and in Section 4 I will use this to interpret the HOL theorem-prover.
In Section 5, the conclusion, I will discuss further work.
1. The calculus of constructions
Definition 1. The calculus of constructions has syntax:
M ::= x|c|Prop|Type|(MM)|(λx : M .M)|(∀x : M)M.
Here Prop and Type are special constants called sorts; s, s′, and s1, etc., will be used for
sorts.1 Conversion will be β-conversion, generated by
(λx : A.M)N  [N/x]M,
where [N/x]M denotes the substitution of N for all free occurrences of x in M , with
bound variables being changed to avoid conflicts. Judgements are of the form Γ  M : A,
where Γ is
x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An.
Here dom(Γ ) = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}. The system has one axiom, namely
 Prop : Type.
It has the following rules:
(start) If x /∈ dom(Γ )
Γ  A : s
Γ, x : A  x : A
(weakening)
Γ  A : B Γ  C : s
Γ, x : C  A : B
1 It is common to use * for Prop,  for Type. I formerly referred to sorts as kinds [5–10].
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(application)
Γ  M : (∀x : A)B Γ  N : A
Γ  MN : [N/x]B
(abstraction)
Γ,x : A  M : B Γ  (∀x : A)B : s
Γ  λx : A.M : (∀x : A)B
(conversion)
Γ  A : B Γ  B ′ : s B =β B ′
Γ  A : B ′
(product)
Γ  A : s Γ, x : A  B : s′
Γ  (∀x : A)B : s′ .
A sequence of assumptions Γ is legal or well-formed if
Γ  Prop : Type.
A necessary and sufficient condition for he sequence
x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An
to be well-formed is that the variables x1, x2, . . . , xn all be distinct and the sequence satisfy
both of the following conditions:
(1) The variable xi does not occur free in A1,A2, . . . ,Ai (but it may occur free in
Ai+1, . . . ,An), and
(2) x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . xi−1 : Ai−1  Ai : s for some sort s.
From now on, all environments will be assumed to be well-formed.
2. Representing logic with equality, propositions-as-types
Let us review the representation of logic and equality in the calculus of constructions
under the propositions-as-types representation. This material comes from [7, Section 6],
where more details will be found.
If x /∈ FV(B) in (∀x : A)B , then we usually write this as A → B or, if A,B : Prop, we
write A ⊃ B .
It is easy to show special cases of (Application) and (Abstraction) are
Γ  M : A → B Γ  N : A
Γ  MN : B
and
Γ,x : A  M : B Γ  A → B : s
Γ  λx : A.M → B
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orΓ  M : A ⊃ B Γ  N : A
Γ  MN : B
and
Γ,x : A  M : B Γ  A ⊃ B : s
Γ  λx : A.M : A ⊃ B .
The conjunction of two propositions A and B is defined by
A∧B ≡ (∀w : Prop)((A→ B → w) → w).
The terms of type A ∧ B are ordered pairs whose first element is in A and whose second
element is in B . The pairing operator and its projections give us the usual properties of
conjunction, including
A → B → A∧ B,
A∧B → A,
A∧B → B.
The disjunction of two propositions A and B is defined by
A∨B ≡ (∀w : Prop)((A→ w) → ((B → w) → w)).
The terms of type A ∨B are disjoint unions of A and B . These unions together with their
injections and the case operator give us the usual properties of disjunction, including
A → A∨ B,
B → A∨B,
A∨B → (∀w : Prop)((A → w) → ((B → w) → w)).
The type void, which is intended to be empty, and which is written ⊥ when it is desired to
emphasize that it is a proposition, is defined by
void ≡ (∀x : Prop)x.
It follows from strong normalization that there is no closed term of type void. The negation
of a proposition A is defined by
¬A ≡ A ⊃ ⊥.
The existential quantifier (∀x : A)B where A,B : Prop and x /∈ FV(A) is defined by
(∃x : A)B ≡ (∀w : Prop)((∀x : A)(B ⊃ w) ⊃ w).
The terms of type (∃x : A)B are pairs whose first element is in A and whose second element
is in B . However, the pairs are defined differently from those of conjunction types, and the
different typing means that although there is a first projection, there is no typable second
projection; see [11]. This pairing operator and the partial projection function give us the
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usual properties of the existential quantifier, including[M/x]B ⊃ (∃x : A)B (for M : A),
(∃x : A)B ⊃ (∀w : Prop)((∀x : A)(B ⊃ w) ⊃ w).
We can also define Leibniz equality over any type: if M,N : A, then
M =A N ≡ (∀z : A → Prop)(zM ⊃ zN).
Then it is easy to prove the usual properties of equality, including the following (for M,N :
A):
M =A M,
M =A N ⊃ (∀z : (A → Prop) ⊃ (zM ⊃ zN)).
It is not hard to see from this that we have all the usual properties of constructive predicate
logic with equality.
We can interpret classical logic by assigning to an atomic constant the type
(∀u : Prop)(¬¬u ⊃ u).
We can also represent truth values:
Bool ≡ (∀u : Prop)(u → u → u),
T ≡ λu : Prop . λx : u . λy : u . x,
F ≡ λu : Prop . λx : u . λy : u . y.
It is easy to prove Bool : Prop,  T : Bool, and  F : Bool.
Berardi [12] assumes extensionality in the following form:
(∀X : A)(∀Y : A)(∀x1 : A1)(∀x2 : A2) . . . (∀xn : An)
((Xx1x2 . . . xn ↔ Yx1x2 . . . xn) ⊃ X =A Y ),
where A ≡ (∀x1 : A1)(∀x2 : A2) . . . (∀xn : An)Prop. This implies (as Berardi shows) that
all inhabited small types are models of untyped λ-calculus, and hence that the successor
function on the natural numbers, σ : N → N, has a fixed-point! For this reason, we will not
assume this form of extensionality in this paper.
For more on extensionality, see Appendix A.
3. Representing logic with equality, Frege style
To carry out the Frege style representation consistently, we need to assume
boolcon : ¬(T =Bool F).
Representing the logical connectives in the Frege style is easy; see [7, pp. 73–74]. We start
with the familiar if ...then ...else operator:
Cond ≡ λu .Prop . λv : Bool . λx : u . λy : u . vuxy.
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Then if A : Prop,M : A,N : A,
CondATMN =β M
and
CondAFMN =β N.
The connectives can now be defined as follows:
¬b ≡ λx : Bool .CondBoolx F T,
∧b ≡ λx : Bool .¬bx Bool F,
∨b ≡ λx : Bool . x Bool T,
⊃b≡ λx : Bool . λy : Bool .¬b(∧b x(¬b y)),
↔b≡ λx : Bool . λy : Bool . (x ⊃b y)∧b (y ⊃b x).
Then the usual truth table rules for these connectives hold as conversions.
The quantifiers, however, are another matter. We want
(1) (∀bx : A)B =Bool T iff (∀x : A)(B =Bool T), and
(2) (∃bx : A)B =Bool T iff (∃x : A)(B =Bool T).
(We may need to add arguments to (∀bx : A)B and (∃bx : A)B .) There are two problems
in achieving these properties. One is that the logic of the calculus of constructions is not
classical. This problem can be easily fixed: postulate
cl : (∀u : Prop)(¬¬u ⊃ u).
This assumption and the assumption that (∀n : N)(¬(σn =N 0)) are proved consistent in [7,
Theorem 23]. Essentially the same method can be used to prove that the above classical
assumption and ¬(T =Bool F) are consistent. For the rest of this paper, we will assume both
of these.
The other problem is more serious: even if the logic is classical, we cannot assume for
A : Prop and B : A → Bool
(∀x : A)(Bx =Bool T)∨ (∃x : A)(Bx =Bool F).
Furthermore, within the logic, there is no way to prove that the only terms of type Bool are
T and F.
Nevertheless, we can define (∀bx : A)(Bx), where A : Prop and B : A → Bool. To do
this, we first let
E1 ≡ (∀x : A)(Bx =Bool T),
E2 ≡ (∃x : A)(Bx =Bool F).
Then we can define (∀bx : A)(Bx) to be ΠbAB , where
Πb ≡ λA : Prop . λB : A → Bool . λu : E1 ∨E2 .
λv : (∃w : E1)(u =E1∨E2 inlE1E2w) ∨ (∃w : E2)(u =E1∨E2 inrE1E2w) .
caseE1E2vBool(λw : E1 .T)(λw : E2 .F),
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where case is defined along with the injections inl and inr for the disjoint sum (disjunction)
in [7, Definition 21]. Note that it is shown in [7] that for A,B,C : Prop, M : A, N : B ,
F : A → C, and G : B → C,
caseAB(inlABM)CFG =β FM
and
caseAB(inrABN)CFG =β GN.
Note that the type of Πb is given by
Πb : (∀A : Prop)(∀B : A → Bool)(∀u : E1 ∨ E2)
(∀v : (∃w : E1)(u =E1∨E2 inlE1E2w) ∨ (∃w : E2)(u =E1∨E2 inrE1E2w))Bool.
It is then easy to show that if M : E1, then inlE1E2M : E1 ∨ E2 and
ΠbAB(inlE1E2M)V =β T,
where V is the obvious proof that
(∃w : E1)(inlE1E2M =E1∨E2 inlE1E2w) ∨
(∃w : E2)(inlE1E2M =E1∨E2 inrE1E2w).
On the other hand, if M : E2, then inrE1E2M : E1 ∨ E2 and
ΠbAB(inrE1E2M)V =β F
where V is the obvious proof that
(∃w : E1)(inrE1E2M =E1∨E2 inlE1E2w)∨
(∃w : E2)(inrE1E2M =E1∨E2 inrE1E2w).
These are two important properties of Πb in one direction. To get the other direction,
assume that we have a proof U of
U : ΠbABMV =Bool T.
Since ΠbABMV : Bool, it follows that we must have M : E1 ∨E2 and
V : (∃w : E1)(M =E1∨E2 inlE1E2w)∨ (∃w : E2)(M =E1∨E2 inrE1E2w).
Now from the second disjunct, we get, as above,
ΠbABMV =β F,
which contradicts the conclusion of U . It therefore follows that the first disjunct holds, and
so we have E1, or (∀x : A)(Bx =Bool T). Similarly, given a proof U of
U : ΠbABMV =Bool F,
we can conclude that (∃x : A)(Bx =Bool F). Thus, we have the desired properties of the
universal quantifier in both directions.
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If we define the predicateBOOL≡ λx : Bool . x =Bool T ∨ x =Bool F,
then it follows that
A : Prop,B : A → Bool,w : (∀x : A)(BOOL(Bx)), u : E1 ∨E2,
v : (∃w : E1)(u =E1 inlE1E2w) ∨ (∃w : E2)(u =E2 inrE1E2w)
 BOOL(ΠbABuv).
For the existential quantifier, let
E3 ≡ (∃x : A)(Bx =Bool T),
E4 ≡ (∀x : A)(Bx =Bool F)
and define
Σb : (∀A : Prop)(∀B : A→ Bool)(∀u : E3 ∨E4)
(∀v : (∃w : E3)(u =E1∨E2 inlE3E4w) ∨ (∃w : E4)(u =E3∨E4 inrE3E4w))Bool
by
Σb ≡ λA : Prop . λB : A → Bool . λu : E3 ∨E4 .
λv : (∃w : E3)(u =E3∨E4 inlE3E4w) ∨ (∃w : E3)(u =E3∨E4 inrE3E4w) .
caseE3E4vBool(λw : E3 .T)(λw : E4 .F).
The desired properties of the existential quantifier follow in much the same way as do those
for the universal quantifier.
This is an example of a general method of defining operators in the Frege style. Sup-
pose we want an operator O(A1,A2, . . . ,An): A with parameters A1,A2, . . . ,An with the
property that
O(A1,A2, . . . ,An) =A
{T if and only if CT (A1,A2, . . . ,An),
F if and only if CF (A1,A2, . . . ,An).
To do this we need the universal closure of
CT (A1,A2, . . . ,An)∨CF (A1,A2, . . . ,An).
If we have that, we can define O(A1,A2, . . . ,An), which we may as well write as O( A),
to be OpA1A2 . . .An, where
OpA1A2 . . .An ≡ λu : CT ( A)∨ CF ( A) .
λv : (∃w : CT ( A)(u =CT ( A) inlCT ( A)CF ( A)w)∨
(∃w : CF ( A))(u =CF ( A) inrCT ( A)CF ( A)w) .
caseCT ( A)CF ( A)uBool(λw : CT ( A) .T)(λw : CF ( A) .F).
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As an example, let us define Boolean Leibniz equality M =bA N over a type A : Prop,
where M,N : A. Here,
CT ≡ (∀z : A → Bool)((∀x : A)(BOOL(zx))⊃ ((zM ⊃b zN) =Bool T)),
CF ≡ (∃z : A → Bool)((∀x : A)(BOOL(zx))∧ ((zM ⊃b zN) =Bool F)).
The definition is then
Eqb ≡ λA : Prop . λx : A.λy : A.λu : CT ∨CF .
λv . (∃w : CT )(u =CT ∨CF inlCT CFw)∨ (∃w : CF )(u =CT ∨CF inrCT CFw .
caseCT CF uBool(λw : CT .T)(λw : CF .F).
We can then take M =bA N as an abbreviation for EqbAMN .
This gives us classical logic with equality. The special case of extensionality
(∀bx : Bool)(∀by : Bool)((x ↔b y)⊃b (x =bBool y)) =Bool T
now follows by definition.
4. Interpreting HOL
Since the HOL theorem prover has a mechanism to convert some2 predicates into types,
it seems natural to interpret HOL types as calculus of constructions predicates. This gives
us a class of interpretations.
The types of HOL have the following syntax:
σ → α|c|c(σ1, σ2, . . . , σn)3|σ1 → σ2,
where α represents a type variable and c represents a type constant. These types can be
interpreted in the calculus of constructions as follows:
(1) Interpret α as variable α∗ : A → Prop for some type A.
(2) Interpret c with arity n as a constant
c∗ : (A1 → Prop) → (A2 → Prop) → ·· · → (An → Prop) → (A → Prop)
for some types A1,A2, . . . ,An,A (n may be 0).
(3) Given HOL types σ1 and σ2 with calculus of constructions interpretations σ ∗1 : A1 →
Prop and σ ∗2 : A2 → Prop,
(σ1 → σ2)∗ ≡ λu : A1 → A2 . (∀x : A1)(σ ∗1 x ⊃ σ ∗2 (ux)).
2 In particular, the predicates converted to types must be satisfied by some closed terms.
3 This is a change of notation from [1], where (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn)op is used instead.
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HOL terms have the syntax:tσ → xσ |cσ |(tσ ′→σ tσ ′)σ |(λxσ1 . tσ2)σ1→σ2 .
The HOL terms are interpreted in the calculus of constructions as follows:
(1) x∗σ ≡ x : A where σ ∗ : A → Prop and  σ ∗x (i.e., σ ∗x is provable).
(2) c∗σ ≡ c : A where σ ∗ : A → Prop and  σ ∗c.
(3) If σ ∗ : A→ Prop and σ ′∗ : A′ → Prop, then
(tσ ′→σ t ′σ ′)
∗ ≡ t∗σ ′→σ (t ′σ ′)∗.
From  (σ ′ → σ)∗t∗ and  σ ′∗t ′, it follows that  σ ∗(tt ′)∗.
(4) If σ1 : A1 → Prop and σ2 : A2 → Prop, then if x∗σ1 ≡ x : A1 and t∗σ2 ≡ t : A2, then
(λxσ1 . tσ2)
∗ ≡ λx : A1 . t : A1 → A2
and  (σ1 → σ2)∗(λx : A1 . t).
An HOL type structure is standard if it contains types bool of truth values and ind of
individuals.
We can interpret a standard type structure if we have the corresponding predicates. We
get them as follows:
(1) (bool)∗ ≡ BOOL : Bool → Prop, and
(2) (ind)∗ ≡ λx : Ind . x =Bool x : Ind → Prop, where Ind : Prop is a new type constant.
An HOL signature is standard if it includes
(1) ⇒bool→bool→bool,
(2) =α→α→bool, and
(3) α→(α→bool)→α .
We interpret these as follows:
(1) (⇒bool→bool→bool)∗ ≡ ⊃b: Bool → Bool → Bool, where it is provable that
 (∀x : Bool)(BOOLx → (∀y : Bool)(BOOLy → BOOL(⊃b xy))).
(2) (=α→α→bool)∗ ≡ EqbA, where α∗ : A → Prop.
(3) ((α→bool)→α)∗ ≡ bA, where b is defined by
b ≡ λA : Prop . λx : A.λf : A → Bool . λu : (f x =Bool T) . x.
It is easy to prove that
b : (∀A : Prop)(∀x : A)(∀f : A → Bool)(∀u : (f x =Bool T))A.
Remark 2. This definition of b does not fully capture all the semantics of a choice oper-
ator, since it specifies a choice based on one of the additional arguments, in particular the
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term in A for which there is a proof that f x =Bool T. This means that it would be possible to
make HOL assumptions that would be incompatible with this interpretation. Nevertheless,
this definition does satisfy the postulates for the choice operator in HOL.
(In some ways, b is more like the independent choice operator δ of [13], which is a
choice operator for which the choices are not fixed, but different choices on the same set
may be different. However, it differs from δ in that the value of a choice is determined by
all the arguments of b .)
If we wanted to have a definition of b fully compatible with the semantics for a general
choice operator, we would need to postulate a new constant
b : (∀A : Prop)(A → (A → Bool) → A)
and then postulate for it
(∀A : Prop)(∀P : A → Prop)((∀x : A)(BOOL(Px)) ⊃
((∃bx : A)(Px) =Bool T) ⊃ (∀a : A)(P (bAaP) =Bool T))∧
((∀bx : A)(Px) =Bool F) ⊃ (∀a : A)(P (bAaP) =Bool F))).
We would need the extra argument of type A in this case to take care of the case, which
cannot arise in HOL but can in the calculus of constructions, in which the type A is not
inhabited. In this case, we expect the value of bAaF to be a. The problem with this
approach is that it requires a new unproved assumption, and this would either require a
consistency proof or else undermine our consistency claims.
Remark 3. Note that if we were dealing with the definition description operator, we could
use this technique and define
ιb ≡ λA : Prop . λa : A.λf : A → Bool . λx : A.
λu : (f x =Bool T)∧ (∀y : A)(fy =Bool T ⊃ y =A x) . x.
This makes the value of ιbAaf the object which can be proved to satisfy the Boolean
predicate function f . For the description operator, the problem of choice does not arise.
Deductive systems in HOL are defined in terms of sequents. An HOL sequent is a
pair (Γ, t), where Γ is a finite set of terms of type bool (the HOL type) and t is a term
of that type. The interpretation t∗ of an HOL term t of type bool has type Bool. If Γ ≡
t1, t2, . . . , tn, then the interpretation of Γ is Γ ∗ ≡ t∗1 , t∗2 , . . . , t∗n . In HOL, Γ  t means that
the sequent (Γ, t) follows from the inference rules. Here, (Γ  t)∗ will be
Γ ∗ =bBool T ⊃ t∗ =bBool T,
where if Γ ≡ t1, t2, . . . , tn, then
(Γ ∗ =bBool T) means t∗1 =bBool T ∧ t∗2 =bBool T ∧ · · · ∧ t∗n =bBool T.
The deductive system of HOL is defined by eight rules of inference, each of which has
the form
Γ1  t1 Γ2  t2 . . . Γn  tn
Γ  t .
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For each of these eight rules of inference, we would like to prove in the calculus of con-
structions
(Γ1  t1)∗ ⊃ (Γ2  t2)∗ ⊃ · · · ⊃ (Γn  tn)∗ ⊃ (Γ  t)∗.
This turns out to be easy for the following seven rules:
(1) Assumption introduction
t  t .
(2) Reflexivity
 t = t .
(3) Beta-conversion
 (λx . t1)t2 = [t2/x]t1 ,
where [t2/x]t1 is substitution with bound variables changed automatically to avoid
clashes.
(4) Substitution
Γ1  t1 = t ′1 Γ2  t2 = t ′2 . . . Γn  tn = t ′n Γ  t[t1, t2, . . . , tn]
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ · · · ∪ Γn ∪ Γ  t[t ′1, t ′2, . . . , t ′n]
,
where t[t1, t2, . . . , tn] denotes a term t with some free occurrences of subterms
t1, t2, . . . , tn singled out and t[t ′1, t ′2, . . . , t ′n] denotes the result of replacing each se-
lected occurrence of ti by t ′i for 1 i  n, with suitable renaming of bound variables
to prevent any free variables from becoming bound in the replacement.
(5) Type instantiation
Γ  t
Γ  [σ1/α1, σ2/α2, . . . , σn/αn]t ,
where none of the type variables α1, α2, . . . , αn occur free in Γ and no distinct vari-
ables in t become identified after the substitution of the σi for the αi .
(6) Discharging an assumption
Γ ∪ {t1}  t2
Γ  t1 ⇒ t2 .
(7) Modus Ponens
Γ1  t1 ⇒ t2 Γ2  t1
Γ1 ∪ Γ2  t2 .
However, there is a problem with the eighth rule:
(8) Abstraction
Γ  t1 = t2
Γ  (λx . t1) = (λx . t2) ,
where x does not occur free in Γ .
J.P. Seldin / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 173–189 185
The problem is that it is not possible to prove in HOL that if Γ  t1 = t2 then t1 and t2 are
convertible. Proving the interpretation of this rule would require postulating the following
version of Boolean extensionality:
(∀A : Prop)(∀B : Prop)(∀x : A)(∀y : A)
([(∀bu : B → A)(xu =bA yu)⊃b (x =b(B→A) y)] =Bool T),
which does not seem to be provable.
5. Conclusion
This interpretation depends on three unproved assumptions:
(1) boolcon : ¬(T =Bool F),
(2) cl : (∀u : Prop)(¬¬u ⊃ u),
(3) ext : (∀A : Prop)(∀B : Prop)(∀x : A)(∀y : A)([(∀bu : B → A)(xu =bA yu) ⊃b
(x =b(B→A) y)] =Bool T).
The first two of these are consistent, by an easy modification of the proof of [7, Theo-
rem 23], as noted above. The third seems reasonable, since it is known that η-reduction
satisfies the Church–Rosser property. I conjecture that the consistency of all three of these
unproved assumptions can be proved consistent by using a term model and so modelling
HOL that two HOL terms are Boolean equal if and only if they are convertible, but I have
not checked the details.
It is natural to ask whether this interpretation of the HOL theorem prover in the calculus
of constructions would be consistent if the choice function were defined as in Remark 3
to satisfy the general semantics of a choice operator, with its extra unproved assumption.
There might be cause for nervousness about this unproved assumption because we would
have both extensionality and the choice operator. However, the argument of [2] fails in
the Frege-style representation of logic being used here. Barbanera and Berardi’s argument
depends on defining a type
U ≡ ∀X : Prop .X → Bool
with U : Prop. For this type U , U → Prop is a retract of it. In our setting, the corresponding
type
V ≡ ∀X : Bool .X → Bool
has type Prop but not type Bool, so the argument is blocked. Furthermore, the interpretation
actually used in the paper does not require this extra unproved assumption.
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Appendix A. More on extensionalityOne might think that the fact that the form of extensionality assumed by Berardi [12]
implies that the successor function on the natural numbers has a fixed point is enough
reason not to assume this form of extensionality. But it might seem that there is another
reason: it raises possible problems with the axiom of choice (AC).
Barbanera and Berardi [2], following Coquand [3] and Pottinger [4], prove that adding
both AC and excluded middle (EM) implies the principle of proof irrelevance (PI), which
is that all terms of any type A : Prop are Leibniz equal. PI therefore implies
T =Bool F,
which is clearly undesirable in any useful proof assistant. Now, by a theorem of Dia-
conescu, which was called to my attention by John Bell (see his [14]), and which states
that AC implies EM in a topos, it would seem that extensionality and AC would imply PI.
However, it turns out that the form of AC needed for the theorem of Diaconescu does
not follow from the forms usually assumed for type theories.
First, let us see the Theorem of Diaconescu and its proof.
Theorem A.1. If there is a choice function
f : (N → Prop) → N
which satisfies
(∀u : N → Prop)((∃x : N)(ux) → u(f u)),
and if extensionality holds, then both EM and PI hold.
Proof. Since AC and EM imply PI, it is sufficient to prove that the existence of f implies
EM. Let α : Prop, and define U,V : N → Prop by
U ≡ λx : N . x =N 0 ∨ α,
V ≡ λx : N . x =N 1 ∨ α.
Then fU,fV : N,  U0, and  V 1. Let a ≡ fU and b ≡ f V . Then a, b : N and, by the
hypothesis on the properties of f , we have
 Ua,  V b.
Thus,
 (a =N 0 ∨ α) ∧ (b =N 1 ∨ α).
By a constructively valid part of distribution,
(A.1) (a =N 0 ∧ b =N 1)∨ α.
Now
y : α  (∀x : N)(Ux ↔ V x).
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From this and extensionality, we get(A.2)y : α  U =N→Prop V.
Hence,
y : α  fU =N fV,
or
(A.3)y : α  a =N b.
From this follows
y : α  ¬(a =N 0 ∧ b =N 1),
from which we can get
z : (a =N 0 ∧ b =N 1) ¬α.
Hence, by (A.1),
 ¬α ∨ α. 
To apply this theorem to type theories, we would have to have the kind of choice func-
tion given in the theorem. Now, the usual form of the axiom of choice in type theory is
(∀A : Prop)(∀B : Prop)(∀P : A → B → Prop)
((∀x : A)(∃y : B)Pxy ⊃ (∃f : A → B)(∀x : A)Px(f x)).
In order for the function f required for Theorem A.1 to be definable from this assumption,
we would need A ≡ N → Prop, B ≡ N, and
P ≡ λu : N → Prop . λx : N . ux.
But then we do not have A : Prop, as required by the axiom. And even if we allow A : Type
in AC, which would work for A ≡ N → Prop, we still do not have the right properties
for f : the hypothesis of this form of the axiom of choice would require a proof that (∀u :
N → Prop)(∃x : N)ux , which is not the hypothesis of Theorem A.1 and is false: take U :
N → Prop to be U ≡ λx : N .¬(x =N x).
But this is not the form of the axiom of choice used to prove that the AC + EM implies
PI. That form is the postulation of two constants:
 : (∀A : Prop)(∀P : A → Prop)((∃x : A)(Px) → A),
in : (∀A : Prop)(∀P : A → Prop)(∀h : (∃x : A)(Px))(P (APh)).
In [2], these constants are called ACF and ACA respectively, and the authors say that
assuming these two constants is stronger than the set-theoretic form of the axiom of choice.
To use these postulates in the proof of the Theorem of Diaconescu, we need to use
λu : N → Prop . λh : (∃x : N)(ux) . Nuh
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for f . But this function has an extra argument, and so a and b now have to be defined bya ≡ NUhU, b ≡ NV hV ,
where hU and hV are the obvious proofs of (∃x : N)Ux and (∃x : N)V x respectively. This
means that from (A.2), we do not get (A.3), but only
y : α  NUhU =N NVhU .
We could try defining b as NVhU , but then instead of  V b, we would need to use the
equality of U and V , and since this requires the equivalence of U and V , instead of  V b,
we would get
y : α  V b.
Instead of (A.1), we would have
y : α  (a =N 0 ∧ b =N 1)∨ α,
and so the conclusion of the proof would be
y : α  ¬α ∨ α,
a triviality.
It would be possible to get around this by assuming an axiom of the form
(∀A : Prop)(∀P1 : A → Prop)(∀P2 : A→ Prop)(∀h1 : (∃x : A)P1x)
(∀h2 : (∃x : A)P2x)(∀x : A)(P1x ↔ P2x)(AP1h1 =A AP2h2).
This axiom is similar to an axiom assumed by Maehara for the -symbol in [15]. However,
with this axiom, extensionality would no longer be needed for the proof of the Theorem of
Diaconescu, since the only inference in its proof that used extensionality would be justified
by the above axiom. So this axiom plus AC implies PI. This makes assuming this axiom
dubious.
It appears that the claim in [2] that the postulation of the two constants  and in is
stronger than the set-theoretic form of AC is not justified.
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